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# The US Legislated a Dollar That Pays Nothing. That Was the Entire Point.
- URL: https://thepaymentsoperator.com/the-us-legislated-a-dollar-that-pays-nothing-that-was-the-entire-point/
- Published: 2025-07-24T12:04:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-18T11:23:02.000Z
- Description: Fully reserved, first in line in insolvency, forbidden to pay interest. The third one is the policy.
- Author: Armando

*Fully reserved, first in line in insolvency, and forbidden to pay interest. Read those three provisions together and the policy becomes obvious.*

The GENIUS Act was signed on 18 July, and the coverage has concentrated almost entirely on the reserve requirement — one-to-one backing, in dollars, Treasuries, repo or similar liquid assets, segregated from operating funds, no rehypothecation, monthly certifications.

That is good, necessary and unsurprising. Anyone who has watched a stablecoin lose its peg knew that was coming.

The provisions worth sitting with are two others, and they only make sense next to each other.

**Holders cannot be paid interest or yield.** The Act prohibits issuers from offering any form of it.

**Holders come first in insolvency.** In a proceeding against a permitted issuer, stablecoin holders have priority over all other claims, with expedited court review and distribution of the reserves.

Now put those beside the reserve rule and describe what has been created, without using the word stablecoin.

A dollar-denominated claim, backed one-to-one by liquid assets held apart from the issuer's own money, ranking ahead of every other creditor if the issuer fails, and paying nothing.

That is a deposit in every respect a consumer would recognise — except that it pays no interest, carries no federal insurance, and is defined by the Act as explicitly not a deposit.

## The yield ban is the policy

Everything else in this statute is plumbing. The yield prohibition is the actual decision, and it was a deliberate one.

Run the counterfactual. Imagine the same instrument with the yield ban removed. Fully reserved in Treasuries, priority over all other creditors in insolvency, instantly transferable, available around the clock, and paying something close to the Treasury rate.

Set that next to a checking account paying nearly nothing, available during banking hours, with the holder ranking as an unsecured creditor above the insured limit.

The second product does not survive that comparison for a sophisticated holder, and the money that moves first is exactly the money banks care about most — large, mobile, rate-sensitive balances. The yield ban is what stands between the US banking system and that migration.

So the Act has defined stablecoins as a **payments instrument** and foreclosed them as a **savings instrument**, by statute. You may use this to move money. You may not use it to store money profitably. If you want yield on dollars, you must go back to a bank or a fund, which is to say back to an intermediary that lends.

I do not say that as a criticism. There is a respectable argument for it: a payment instrument that also pays interest pulls deposits out of the institutions that extend credit to households and businesses, and credit intermediation is not a side effect of banking, it is the point of it. Reasonable people can hold that view.

But it should be named for what it is, which is industrial policy, rather than described as a technical safeguard. The reserve rule protects the holder. The yield ban protects the banks. Both may be right. They are not the same kind of provision.

## Where the fight will happen

The prohibition, as drafted, restricts the *issuer*. It does not explicitly bar an affiliate or a third party from offering an interest-bearing product around the stablecoin.

That is a seam, and seams of that size do not stay unexplored. The economics are too large: whoever can legally hand a holder the yield on the reserves backing their tokens has an enormous advantage over anyone who cannot.

I would expect the next two years of lobbying, structuring and eventually litigation to concentrate there, not on reserves. And I would expect the banking industry to defend that boundary harder than it defended anything else in the bill, because the boundary is the bill.

For anyone operating in payments, the practical implication is to watch what gets built *around* permitted issuers rather than by them. The interesting structures will be affiliates, partnerships and reward programmes that deliver economically what the issuer may not deliver directly.

## The part written for the rest of us

There is a section of this Act that almost no coverage outside the United States has engaged with, and it is the section that will matter most to anybody reading this from Latin America.

A non-US issuer may offer payment stablecoins in the United States only if it meets the Act's licensing and compliance requirements, including registration with the OCC and holding reserves at US financial institutions — and only if the Treasury first concludes that the issuer's **home regulator operates a comparable regime**.

Read that slowly, because of what it does.

The United States has not merely regulated its own market. It has made its framework the reference standard that other jurisdictions must be measured against in order for their institutions to reach the dollar market. No treaty, no negotiation, no multilateral process. A determination by the Treasury about whether your country's rules are good enough.

And the enforcement behind it is not symbolic. An issuer found out of compliance with a lawful seizure, freeze or burn order faces civil penalties of up to one million dollars per violation per day. Digital service providers that facilitate secondary trading of a non-compliant token face up to one hundred thousand dollars per violation per day. Treasury can bar US platforms from listing the token and revoke market access entirely.

For a payments business anywhere in the world that denominates in dollars, that is a jurisdictional reality regardless of where you are incorporated.

## The law is not in force yet

One detail that should temper every confident projection written this month, including this one.

The Act takes effect on the earlier of eighteen months after enactment — around January 2027 — or one hundred and twenty days after the federal agencies issue final implementing regulations. Those regulations are required through notice and comment within a year, and they have to establish tailored standards for capital, liquidity, reserve diversification, interest rate risk, and operational, compliance and technology risk.

In other words: the statute exists and the rules that will actually govern anybody do not. The questions an operator would want settled — how much capital, what liquidity, how diversified the reserves must be, whether all holders redeem directly from the issuer or whether intermediaries may process redemptions — are open.

That last one is not a detail. Whether redemption runs through intermediaries determines whether there is a role in this market for institutions like ours, or whether the issuer is expected to face every holder directly. Nobody has answered it.

So the honest status is that the United States has passed a law and has not yet written the rules. Between now and the moment those rules land, everything anyone says about how this will work in practice — mine included — is inference.

## From a Mexico City desk

For México this legislation is not primarily a payments story, and I think most of the regional commentary has the emphasis wrong.

Start with what it is. In a country with its own volatile currency and restricted access to dollar accounts, a fully reserved dollar claim that anyone can hold in a phone is an escape hatch. It is a way to hold hard currency without a US bank account, without a Mexican dollar account, and without asking anyone's permission.

That use case is not hypothetical here. México has spent years limiting how ordinary people can deposit and hold dollar cash in the banking system, for reasons that had nothing to do with technology and everything to do with where the cash came from. The GENIUS Act repeals none of that. It simply makes the alternative legal, reserved and supervised on the other side of the border.

So this is, first, a currency substitution question. Not a sudden one — nothing in this law makes a Mexican household wake up holding dollars. But a credible, regulated, yield-free dollar that lives in an app is a different proposition from an unregulated one, and the thing that made the unregulated version easy to dismiss was precisely that it was unregulated.

Which is why the yield ban matters more here than almost anywhere.

If the instrument paid interest, it would compete directly with peso deposits, and an interest-bearing dollar deposit inside a phone is the most efficient route to deposit flight anyone has ever designed. By forbidding yield, the United States made its tokenised dollar safe for its own banks — and incidentally much less dangerous for ours. A dollar that pays nothing is a store of value and a settlement rail. It is not a savings account, and savings is where the deposit base lives.

That is a genuine piece of good fortune for Mexican banks, and it is worth saying plainly that it was not designed for our benefit. It is a side effect of a domestic American compromise, and side effects can be withdrawn.

The second thing it is: a settlement instrument. That is where the opportunity sits.

What we do not have, and have never had, is direct access to the system that settles dollars. Our dollars move internationally through correspondent banks — through somebody else's compliance department, on somebody else's calendar, at a price we are quoted rather than negotiate. Against that, a fully reserved, statutorily protected, instantly transferable dollar claim is interesting for a reason that has nothing to do with household currency risk. It is interesting as a settlement instrument, and the yield ban, which is the fatal flaw for a savings product, barely matters for that use — nobody expects their settlement rail to pay interest.

And México has the corridor. The remittance flow into this country is among the largest in the world, and it runs through a chain of intermediaries, nearly every one of which takes a margin for performing a step that this instrument performs structurally.

Which leads to the thing I would actually put in front of a Mexican regulator.

The comparability determination is a competitive position. Whichever regulator in this region first establishes a regime that the US Treasury deems comparable gives its licensed institutions a path into this market that their neighbours will not have. México has an unusually strong claim to want that position, because México has the volume that makes it worth something.

And the mirror of that is the warning. Comparability runs both ways. A jurisdiction whose framework is judged weak does not simply fail to gain access — it gets a published assessment by the US Treasury of the quality of its financial regulation. For a country that has spent the last decade managing exactly that kind of reputational exposure, that is not a small thing, and it should be in the room when the decision about whether to engage is taken.

## My judgment

This is a better statute than I expected, and the insolvency priority in particular is stronger consumer protection than most people have registered. Ranking holders ahead of all other claims is not a technicality; it is a deliberate choice to make this instrument safe at the expense of the issuer's other creditors.

But the Act's architecture is unmistakable once you see it. It permits stablecoins to compete with banks on speed, availability and cost, and forbids them from competing on return. That is the whole design, and everything else follows from it.

What I will be watching is not the reserve rules, which are settled in principle. It is two things: how the affiliate boundary around the yield ban gets tested, because it will be; and what the implementing regulations say about redemption through intermediaries, because that single answer determines whether institutions like mine have a role in this market or watch it from outside.

Neither of those is in the Act. Both will be decided in the next eighteen months, mostly in rooms that no one from this region will be in.

## Three questions for the people who own this

**1.** If a fully reserved, non-yielding dollar token became a usable settlement instrument for cross-border flows, what would it replace in your institution — and do you know what that line currently costs you?

**2.** The Act leaves open whether holders redeem directly from issuers or through intermediaries. Which answer puts your institution in the flow, and has anyone at your institution read the consultation calendar?

**3.** Comparability of your home regime is a Treasury determination that your institutions do not control but will be bound by. Who in your country is responsible for that conversation — the central bank, the superintendency, the banking association? If the honest answer is nobody, that is worth raising this quarter rather than next year.

Reply to this email with a line or two. The sharpest answers will shape the next issue.

## Sources

**Covington & Burling, July 2025** — the GENIUS Act signed into law on 18 July 2025; issuance limited to subsidiaries of federally regulated insured depository institutions, nonbank institutions supervised by the OCC, and state-chartered entities under federal or substantially similar state standards; one-to-one reserve backing in dollars, Treasuries, repo proceeds or similar approved liquid assets, segregated from operating funds, with no rehypothecation and monthly reserve-adequacy certifications; publicly available redemption policies; the effective date as the earlier of eighteen months after enactment or one hundred and twenty days after final implementing regulations; and the non-US issuer regime, including OCC registration, reserves held at US financial institutions, the Treasury comparability determination, and the penalty structure of up to $1 million per violation per day for issuers and $100,000 per violation per day for digital service providers facilitating secondary trading. [Link](https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2025/07/the-genius-act-becomes-law-key-provisions-from-the-federal-stablecoin-regulatory-framework?ref=thepaymentsoperator.com)

**Latham & Watkins, July 2025** — the prohibition on issuers offering any form of interest or yield to holders, and the absence of an explicit bar on affiliate or third-party interest-bearing arrangements; the priority of stablecoin holders over all other claims against a permitted issuer in insolvency, with expedited court review and distribution; the requirement for implementing regulations through notice and comment within one year and for tailored standards covering capital, liquidity, reserve diversification, interest rate risk and operational, compliance and technology risk; the open question of whether all holders may redeem directly from issuers or whether intermediaries may process redemptions; and the exclusion of national currencies, deposits as defined in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and securities from the definition of a payment stablecoin. [Link](https://www.lw.com/en/insights/the-genius-act-of-2025-stablecoin-legislation-adopted-in-the-us?ref=thepaymentsoperator.com)

Both are law firm analyses published in the days after enactment; I have not read the statute itself. The reading of the yield prohibition as the Act's central policy choice, and of the comparability determination as a competitive position for small jurisdictions, is mine.